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SHOULD THE STATE
AID PRIVATE SCHOOLS?t
ROBERT F. DRINAN, S.J.*

N EARLY APRIL 1961, the United States Supreme Court will be asked

to review a decision of Vermont's highest court which on January 3,
1961 denied aid to private schools.' In this decision the Vermont Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a plan by which students could
receive tuition from the town of South Burlington to attend Catholic
high schools in Burlington. The opinion of the Vermont court constitutes not merely a topical but a rather significant point of departure in
the discussion of a subject where the arguments and the emotions on
both sides have in the past few weeks rivalled Castro, the Congo and
unemployment as front-page news.
Catholics in America have expressed deep disappointment at the
Vermont decision. 2 Some Catholics have welcomed the fact that the
case as of this time is to be appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. In the view of these indignant parents, the nation's highest
tribunal could not condone this denial of the rights of religious parents
to have an education for their children consistent with their consciences. 3
More reflective Catholics and many others, however, consider that the
Vermont decision, since it seems to rest on both the Vermont and
federal constitutions, will be denied review by the United States Supreme
Court.
tAn address delivered at the Regional Convention of the American Association of
School Administrators, March 28, 1961, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
*A.B., M.A., Boston College; S.T.L., Weston College; LL.B., LL.M., Georgetown
University. Dean of Boston College Law School.
1 Swart v. Town School Dist.,

-Vt.-,

2 See AMERICA, Jan. 28, 1961, p. 552.

167 A.2d 514 (1961).

3 See generally the newsletter "Fair Share News" of the organization, Citizens for
Educational Freedom, 3109 So. Grand Blvd., St. Louis 18, Missouri. This is a
voluntary group dedicated to "A Fair Share for Every Child."
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The Vermont Plan
Under a statute which in its original plan
goes back to the year 1869, Vermont law
recognizes the right of parents to participate in the selection of a school for their
children. In a law which could not possibly
be enacted in today's educational climate
the legislature of Vermont provided that:
Each town district shall maintain a high
school or furnish secondary instruction, as
hereinafter provided, for its advanced pupils
at a high school or academy, to be selected
by the parents or guardian of the pupil,

within or without the state. The board of
school directors may both maintain a high
school and furnish secondary instruction
elsewhere as herein provided as in the
judgment of the board may best serve the
4
interest of the pupils.
A clearer recognition of parents' rights
in education could hardly be desired. Not
merely may the parents select the school
in the absence of a public high school but
may even sometimes be able to exercise
this right when the town does furnish a
public high school.
Tuition is regulated as follows: "Each
town school district shall pay tuition per
pupil per school year as billed, but not in
excess of $325.00 unless authorized by a
vote of the town school district ... "5
Under this arrangement in 1958-1959 the
sum of $19,687.50 was paid directly to the
Rice Memorial High School in Burlington for the education of many South Burlington students at this Catholic school. The
sum of $2,025 was paid in the same year
to Mount St. Mary's Academy in Burling-

I VT.

STAT. ANN. tit.
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ton, a school also owned by the Diocese of
Burlington.
The Supreme Court of Vermont, having
been asked to rule on the permissibility of
this arrangement, referred to the case as
presenting "sensitive and solemn issues."
The court spoke with understanding of the
parent who "shares the expense of maintaining the public school system yet in
loyalty to his child and his belief seeks
religious training for the child elsewhere."
The court spoke of "considerations of
equity and fairness" which "exerted a
strong appeal," but found that the school
board of South Burlington, "while acting
within the literal provisions of the statute,
[has] . .. exceeded the limits of the United
States Constitution." The opinion is not
entirely clear as to whether the parental
right statute also violates the Vermont constitution. The court seems to rely principally
for its opinion on the following dicta taken
from the Zorach v. Clauson6 decision:
"Government may not finance religious
groups nor undertake religious instruction
nor blend secular and sectarian education
nor use secular institutions to force one or
'7
some religion on any person."
Assuming that this statement represents
the controlling law, the Vermont court
found that the "fusion of secular and sectarian education . . . undertaken in religious denominational high schools that are
an integral part of the Roman Catholic
Church" was something in which, by command of the first amendment, "the state
shall not participate."
The court added that the government
may not pay tuition to high schools when
"the Church is the source of their control

16, §793(a) (1958). (Em-

phasis added.)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §793(b)

(1958).
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6 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
7 Id. at 314. (Emphasis added.)
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and the principal source of their support."
The court continues that "this combination
of factors renders the service of the Church
and its ministry inseparate from its educational function." The court recognized that
a Catholic school "is a high and dedicated undertaking . . . and deserves the
respect of all creeds" but ruled that "however worthy the object" and "however
compelling" the "equitable considerations"
the arrangement violates "constitutional
barriers."
The Vermont decision, while paying lip
service to the "faithful parent" and acknowledging the "severity of this mandate"
(its decision) and the "heavy burdens" it
will impose, is nonetheless an opinion that
is unsatisfactory because it does not really
analyze the problem before it, nor seek any
way in which to reconcile the desires of
religious parents with the first amendment.
The decision, furthermore, is not clear
as to the manner in which Catholic or other
parents might be able to exercise the option
granted to them by the lawmakers of Vermont who have never subscribed to the
philosophy of a public school monopoly.
What if Catholics or others established
schools that were not "an integral part"
of a church and did not have a church as
"the source of their control and the principal source of their support"? Does the
court mean that "the service of the Church
and its ministry" are "inseparate" or "inseparable" from its educational function?
At what point does the "fusion of secular
and sectarian instruction" in a school cause
the school to turn into a virtual seminary
where the pupils are only working "in the
pursuit of their religious beliefs"?
Many of the arguments presented by the
parents in the Vermont case were not
taken up in the court's opinion although

Justice Holden in his opening paragraph
stated that the "cause has been well argued
and thoughtfully presented." Perhaps it
would have made no difference if the court
had tried to discuss some of the more fundamental issues. The result would probably
be the same. The court would have replied
with the same answers as the National Education Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Jewish Congress
and the National Council of Churches.
Every educator has heard these replies or
rather the outright rejection of the religious
parent's familiar arguments revolving
around double taxation, distributive justice
and the rights of parents in a pluralistic
society.
The Vermont decision has been presented at some length because it is a recent
restatement of the position of most educational associations, and of virtually all
Protestant and Jewish bodies.
Can any new argument be made for the
parent who insists that he is required in
conscience to have a school where the
teachers do "blend secular and sectarian
education"? This observer feels that most
educators, viewing the dilemma of the religious parent as the Vermont Supreme
Court did, have profound misgivings about
the way in which the problem of the religious parent is being solved. The ever
growing and often bitter resentment which
Catholic and other parents have over
"double taxation" cannot fail to impress
and worry the fair-minded observer who
sees 5,088,000 children - or almost every
eighth American child - enrolled in Catholic primary and secondary schools.
Before an attempt can be made to probe
into this question more deeply than the
Vermont court was able to do, it is first
necessary to analyze in some detail the im-

7
portant question of what name we should
give to the nonpublic school.
What Shall We Call Our
"Nonpublic" Schools?
The term "public school" is a prestigeladen title which, in Madison Avenue parlance, has a built-in appeal to the mind and
heart of every American. Americans have
for so long been conditioned to hearing of
the glories of the public school that the
nonpublic school has by its very name a
negative connotation. The term "nonpublic" assumes or implies that such a school
does not fulfill a public function, is not
blessed by public authorities and is not
responsible or accountable to the public.
The term "private" school contains perhaps even more negative implications. A
"private" school suggests an exclusiveness,
based perhaps on snobbery or wealth. The
"private school" designation, when applied
to Catholic primary and secondary schools,
is particularly inappropriate because these
schools are not "private" in any of the
senses which that term implies in the popular mind.
Even more unfortunate is the title "parochial" school. The term is more and more
factually erroneous since so many Catholic
schools are no longer "parish" schools.
More importantly, the school termed "parochial" is by implication a mere extension
of the religious mission of the parish.
The terms "Catholic school" or "Churchrelated school" or "sectarian school" not
only share in the negative connotations of
every "nonpublic" school but furthermore
imply that their principal function is to
serve as an extension of Sunday school.
It has been the experience of this writer
that no intelligent dialogue about nonpublic
schools is possible until we set aside the
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tyranny of labels. Let us employ the
language of the Zorach opinion and call
public schools "secular" and Churchrelated schools "sectarian." Should the
state finance only "secular" schools - those
schools in which it is forbidden by the nation's highest tribunal to "blend" the secular with the sectarian?
Using this terminology let us propose
three arguments which show that it is. unfair for a democratic state to aid only the
"secular" school and to penalize the "secular-sectarian" school.
(1) It is unfair to coerce students to attend a "secular" school by placing an economic boycott on the "secular-sectarian"
school.
(2) Parents and children have a constitutional right not to be coerced into attending a "secular" school or to be penalized
for attending a "sectarian" school since
such attendance is an integral part of the
"free exercise" of their religion which
Congress and the states by the first amendment may not prohibit or restrict.
(3) A truly democratic pluralistic society would, without fear of national disunity, allow parents and all responsible
groups to operate tax-supported schools
where the "secular" would be fused with
the "sectarian" or where militant agnosticism would be taught.
Parents or children should not be coerced
into "secular" schools by a state economic
boycott on all other schools. A "secular"
school cannot strictly speaking teach even
the existence of God since to many Protestants no knowledge of God can be obtained
except by an act of faith. Even the existence of God therefore is "sectarian." Are
there some "sacred" but not "sectarian"
truths which the "secular" school may communicate? To Catholics and those who be-
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lieve in the natural law certain "sacred"
truths concerning the existence and nature
of God are knowable by reason independently of revelation. But these truths would
be "sectarian" to all others.
One sees, therefore, that the "secular"
school is by law under a severe limitation
on its academic freedom. It may presumably discuss the "sectarian" but can never
teach any truth concerning it since this
would "blend" the "sectarian" with the
"secular." A more formidable intellectual
strait jacket could hardly be devised.
The "secular" school has clearly been
given a philosophy of education by the
United States Supreme Court - a philosophy which assumes that a good education can be given divorced from the realities of the faith or lack of faith of the
recipients of the education. How pupils
involved in such an educational process can
be taught about the great issues of life,
history and human destiny remains a mystery. Such a school may be more mythical
than real since, as Mr. Justice Jackson
pointed out in McCollum v. Board of
Educ.,s mathematics, physics or chemistry
are, or can be, completely secularized but
music, architecture, painting, biology and
English literature can hardly be taught
without at least inferentially blending something "sectarian" into the presentation.
It cannot realistically be maintained that
the "secular" school is truly a "neutral"
school concerning religion. The impact of
the "secular" school on students for thirty
hours a week over a period of twelve years
is enormous. And that impact is inevitably
one which minimizes the importance and
even the relevance of the "sectarian." As
Sir Walter Moberly puts it:

On the fundamental religious issue the
modern [school] intends to be and supposes
it is neutral, but it is not.., it does what
is far more deadly than open rejection; it
ignores Him [God]. . . . It is a fallacy to suppose that by omitting a subject you teach
nothing about it. On the contrary - you

teach that it is to be omitted, and that therefore it is a matter of secondary importance.
And you teach this not openly and explicitly.., you simply take it for-granted and

thereby insinuate it silently, insidiously and
all but irresistibly. 10

If we honestly face the fact, therefore,
that the "secular" school must by law discriminate (the word is not too strong)
against all "sectarian" considerations then
does it not follow that nonbelievers receive
in a "secular" school an education which
confirms their beliefs, whereas believers
are subjected to an atmosphere which challenges if not contradicts their basic convictions. It is not really true that the "secular"
school is "omnisectarian," as some have
claimed. It cannot be such and still comply
with the "no-blending" doctrine which is at
the moment the highest law of the land. If
one follows the literal logic of the "noblending" doctrine the "secular" school
must divorce faith from reason, law from
morals and religion from life.
There are movements active today to
make the public school even more secular
than it is. In Miami, for example, the
American Jewish Congress is the prime
mover in a suit to force the discontinuance
of a large number of practices such as
Bible-reading, religious assemblies, psalm
singing and other customs of a school system which, until recently, by reason of its
faculty, students and tradition, commingled
a certain Protestant piety with its otherwise secular education.

8 333 U. S. 203 (1948).
9 Id. at 235-36.

10 MOBERLY, CRISIS IN THE UNIVERSITY (1949).
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It is difficult to be enthusiastic about the
plaintiff's allegations in this case since the
daily or weekly presence or absence of a
few moments of collective piety hardly
makes any difference in the over-all impact on a student of thirty hours a week of
"secular" education from which all "sectarian" values have been carefully omitted.
Is it then a denial of religious liberty to
coerce a child who is deeply committed
to "sectarian" truths into an atmosphere
where it will be assumed that this commitment is irrelevant to the child's education?
Not all public school educators will, of
course, accept the full consequences of the
"no-blending" doctrine. In fact some have
tried to minimize the rigor of the doctrine
in order to save the public school from the
accusation of being called "secularistic."
In New York, for example, the Board of
Education some time ago adopted unanimously a statement providing for the teaching of spiritual ideals in New York City public schools. This statement authorizes teachers to advance "the training in the home,
ever intensifying in the child that love for
God, for parents and for home which is
the mark of true character." It is hard to
see how "intensifying" in a child its "love
for God" can be reconciled with the prohibition on "blending" the "secular" with
the "sectarian."
Religious Freedom And
Tax-Supported Education
The central issue then - our second "undeveloped" argument - is the question of
whether believers have, by reason of the
first amendment's protection of the "free
exercise" of religion, a right not to be
pressured by economic penalties into a
school system where "sectarian" values deemed paramount to life and education
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by the believers - are treated as irrelevant in education?
American courts are not too familiar
with the arguments surrounding the "central issue." The case of the Catholic parent
involved in the Vermont tuition suit has
never in our history been presented to the
United States Supreme Court. It is interesting to speculate'what the nation's highest
tribunal would have done if the Vermont
courts had agreed with the arguments of
the Catholic parents and allowed the parental right statute to stand. Would the
United States Supreme Court reach out
into Vermont and dictate to its school
boards that only "secular" schools may
receive the tax money of the citizens of
Vermont?
American law has been quite sympathetic to "educational conscientious objectors." Recently in Pennsylvania everyone sought a compromise solution for
Amish parents who refused to send their
children to a new public high school because it was "too worldly." Christian Scientists have had their children excused
from health instruction classes and Jehovah
Witnesses need not salute the flag.
Do any of these precedents contain principles by which the religious parent can
justify his claim that a "sectarian" school
should be financed for him since this is a
part of the "free exercise" of religion constitutionally guaranteed to him despite the
"no-establishment" clause in the same first
amendment?
Is the "no-establishment" doctrine an
absolute to such an extent that the "free
exercise" of religion must be carried out
in a way that requires no state funds?
Clearly this is so and should be so where
the "free exercise" is carried on in voluntary services of worship which the state
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does not in any way require. But when the
state legally compels individuals to perform
certain tasks, may the state require them
to perform these duties in a situation into
which the "sectarian" elements of life may
not be blended?
If citizens are involuntarily detained in
mental hospitals, prisons or military units,
both the law and public opinion feel generally that the state should provide those
"sectarian" aids to which the detained
have been accustomed. Is there some analogy to students "detained" by law for
thirty hours a week for twelve years?
Is the "right" of parents and children
to an education not separated from all
"sectarian" considerations a sheer immunity or a full-bodied right assured of
implementation?
Catholics have tended to underemphasize that aspect of Catholic schools which
would make of them a vehicle by which
Catholics practice the "free exercise" of
religion. Such an image of Catholic schools
tends to imply that they provide only extended catechism classes rather than a
fully developed system of secular education. Catholics have quite understandably
stressed the great service to the community
and nation provided by the rapidly expanding system of Catholic schools. The accent
has been on the idea that the state should
assist Catholic schools which "save" the
state millions of dollars annually.
This argument, however persuasive to
Catholics and some others, seems to assume or possibly must assume that Catholic parents and children are constitutionally
empowered under the "free exercise"
clause to conduct nonpublic "sectarian"
schools and consequently should not be
economically penalized for asserting a, right
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

If this assumption is required then what
is needed is a declaration by the United
States Supreme Court that the full thrust
of the "free exercise" of religion includes
the operation of "secular-sectarian" schools
which can receive tax support.
How far will the Supreme Court say the
"free exercise" of religion may be extended? Does the "free exercise" clause
contain implicitly the right to have one's
children in a state-financed "secular-sectarian" school?
Will the Supreme Court ever come to the
conviction that the "free exercise" of religion should logically mean the adoption of
Article 2 of the Council of Europe's Convention on Human Rights subscribed to by
fifteen nations of Europe?-That article, intended as an implementation to Article 26
of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights adopted by the United Nations and
the United States in 1948, reads as follows:
[I]n the exercise of any functions which it
assumes in relation to education and to
-teaching, the state shall respect the right
of parents to ensure such education and
teaching as is conformable to their religious and philosophical convictions.
In the whole history of Supreme Court
decisions on the "free exercise" clause only
one substantial claim has been rejected the request of the Mormons to practice
bigamy as a part of their "free exercise"
of religion. The Supreme Court has sought
to allow all other requests for an extension
of the, "free exercise" privilege indicating
that only a "clear and present danger"
would justify a restriction on religious freedom. It should be noted that the Everson
v. Board of Educ.11 and the Zorach v.
Clauson12 decisions, despite what they said
11330 U.S. 1 (1947).
12 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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about the "no-establishment" clause, in
effect broadened religious liberty. A good
deal of thinking and probably more than
one solidly researched "Brandeis brief"
will be required before the Supreme Court
will rule that the "free exercise" of religion
includes the constitutional right to have
one's children educated in a state-financed
"secular-sectarian" school.
One of the most formidable, though
formless, difficulties will be the universally expressed fear that aid to the nonpublic school will undermine the public school
and weaken national unity. This difficulty
brings us to our third point: does a truly
democratic society need to depend for its
unity on its public schools?
Pluralism in Education
Although we have been told by the
Supreme Court and all constitutional experts that the Constitution was designed for
people of "fundamentally different faiths"
it appears that America is afraid to allow
the "fundamentally different faiths" of its
people to be operative in its public schools.
No less a person than Mr. Justice Frankfurter urged "thought-control" in our
schools in these startling, words in the
McCollum decision: "in no other activity
of the state is it more vital to keep out
divisive forces than in its schools."
'Many other jurists and educators have
expressed the conviction and hope that our
public schools will promote national unity.
Although these distinguished critics of
American life would deny that they want
public schools to promote "togetherness"
or to "homogenize" children, the whole
coloration of the seemingly widely accepted
concept that public schools should promote
national unity is - to be very candid distressing.
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It is never clear in discussions on the
supposed unifying effect on children of the
public school whether the students become
unified by merely mingling together or
whether the mystique or the instruction of
the public school produces a unifying
effect - an effect which somehow is thought
to be highly desirable.
How much unity and how much pluralism do we want in our schools? It seems
fair to say that some - perhaps most writers on the public schools are afraid of
pluralism in education. The growth of nonpublic schools and, much more so, any
possible state aid to such schools, is looked
upon as a threat to the public school and, as
the argument inevitably becomes more
emotional, to the "future of American
democracy"!
What anxiety - even neurosis - afflicts
so many Americans that they are persuaded that our national unity is so brittle
that it would be threatened if the "secular"
schools had a system of companion "secular-sectarian" schools? Can the communication of sectarian values blended into
secular subjects be such a threat to a nation
established by profoundly religious citizens? Or is it the mere separation of pupils
into "secular" schools and "secular-sectarian" schools that causes the friends of
the former to take upon themselves the
completely noneducational function of promoting national unity?
The argument that nonpublic schools are
less desirable because they do less for national unity than public schools is formidable because it is formless. It assumes
a dozen major premises, is based ultimately
on emotion and yet, it seems to this writer,
represents the most frequently advanced
nonlegal argument against the proposal
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that the "secular-sectarian" school be publicly financed.
John C. Bennett has a good point in this
connection. If, Dr. Bennett writes, the advocates of no aid to private schools desired
to do something about the allegedly less
democratic outlook imparted in the nonpublic school, they could arrange that these
schools be supplied with and required to
use the same secular textbooks as are used
by the students in the public school. The
use of these books in both systems of
school would be "in the interest of the unity
of the community." 13
In the ultimate analysis the real opposition to aid to the "secular-sectarian"
schools derives from the failure to comprehend the true nature of our pluralistic
society or a fear to face its consequences.
The "secular" school was the creation of
a new and growing nation in the last century. America's religious sociology has
changed radically since that time so that
the "secular" school is no longer consistent
with the conscience of a significant portion
of the nation's citizens.

13 BENNETT, CHRISTIANS AND

(1958).
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Unfortunately the United States Supreme
Court has "frozen" the solution of the last
century into a "dogma" of constitutional
law. The "dogma" has reached its long
arm into Vermont and has told Catholic
parents that the state has a monopoly on
education and that the "secular" school is
the only school which merits tax support.
Most of the Catholic parents of America think that this is an unjust decision.
They express their sense of injustice with
varying degrees of emotion. It would seem
fair to say that this sense of injustice is
deepening and widening and that the emotions deriving from it are causing an ever
more bitter sense of resentment toward
the American legal system which has canonized the "secular" and penalized the
"secular-sectarian" school.
What will America and its courts decide
about this resentment in the generation to
come? Will America follow the example of
Holland, England, Belgium and France and
allow believing parents to have their faith
blended into the education of their children? Or will America stiffen its legal attitude on private schools and extend its
monopoly to all educational institutions?
That is the central question confronting
American education today.

